- 12 Apr, 2015 1 commit
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Jeff Sharkey authored
When a private volume is mounted, create an emulated volume above it hosted at the /media path on that device. That emulated volume is automatically torn down when unmounting the private volume. Add "removed" state for volume, which signals to framework that media has left the building, send when the volume is destroyed. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: I1f82b51de578ac5cfcc5d7b9a6fb44f6f25c775c
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- 11 Apr, 2015 1 commit
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Jeff Sharkey authored
Sadly setexeccon() is process global, so we need to carefully ensure that all exec() are mutually exclusive to avoid transitioning into unwanted domains. Also, because we have several threads floating around, we need to guard all our FDs with O_CLOEXEC. Format all newly created volumes immediately after partitioning, but silence all events emitted from those volumes to prevent the framework from getting all excited. Unify all notify events under a single codepath to make them easy to silence. Sent SIGINT before escalating to SIGTERM when unmounting. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: Idc6c806afc7919a004a93e2240b42884f6b52d6b
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- 07 Apr, 2015 1 commit
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Jeff Sharkey authored
Mount private volumes at /mnt/expand, which is where we have new SELinux policy waiting for us. Also ensure that foundational directories are ready when mounting. Create local fs_prepare_dir() wrapper that sets SELinux context based on path, avoiding the need for a later restorecon. Use UUID as directory name for public volumes. Wait a few seconds before issuing first signal when force unmounting. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: If22595380faaae321705b06c87d877419620da48
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- 01 Apr, 2015 1 commit
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Jeff Sharkey authored
This adds support for private volumes which is just a filesystem wrapped in a dm-crypt layer. For now we're using the exact same configuration as internal encryption (aes-cbc-essiv:sha256), but we don't store any key material on the removable media. Instead, we store the key on internal storage, and use the GPT partition GUID to identify which key should be used. This means that private external storage is effectively as secure as the internal storage of the device. That is, if the internal storage is encrypted, then our external storage key is also encrypted. When partitioning disks, we now support a "private" mode which has a PrivateVolume partition, and a currently unused 16MB metadata partition reserved for future use. It also supports a "mixed" mode which creates both a PublicVolume and PrivateVolume on the same disk. Mixed mode is currently experimental. For now, just add ext4 support to PrivateVolume; we'll look at f2fs in a future change. Add VolumeBase lifecycle for setting up crypto mappings, and extract blkid logic into shared method. Sprinkle some more "static" around the cryptfs code to improve invariants. Bug: 19993667 Change-Id: Ibd1df6250735b706959a1eb9d9f7219ea85912a0
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