1. 09 Nov, 2015 4 commits
  2. 06 Nov, 2015 1 commit
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation · 3aa9ad54
      Jouni Malinen authored
      
      All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
      room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
      fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
      The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
      buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
      termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
      
      Bug: 25510821
      
      Change-Id: Ic509a6efedc3da9ff40f2842fab5547d087f64de
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
      3aa9ad54
  3. 22 Apr, 2015 3 commits
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      am 2a856dee: Merge "P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it" · 06fc3ecc
      Alex Klyubin authored
      * commit '2a856dee':
        P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
      06fc3ecc
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it · e1499681
      Jouni Malinen authored
      
      This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
      p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
      was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
      arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
      dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
      heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
      peer discovery purposes.
      
      This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
      behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
      due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
      and potentially arbitrary code execution.
      
      Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
      hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
      
      (cherry picked from commit fdb708a3)
      
      Change-Id: Ibc53ff533f78cfcd7c51fbb5d5494b828f184cc8
      e1499681
  4. 10 Apr, 2015 2 commits
  5. 09 Apr, 2015 3 commits
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      am b73408d1: am fdb708a3: P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it · dc5da6ac
      Jouni Malinen authored
      * commit 'b73408d1':
        P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
      dc5da6ac
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      am fdb708a3: P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it · b73408d1
      Jouni Malinen authored
      * commit 'fdb708a3':
        P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
      b73408d1
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it · fdb708a3
      Jouni Malinen authored
      
      This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
      p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
      was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
      arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
      dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
      heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
      peer discovery purposes.
      
      This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
      behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
      due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
      and potentially arbitrary code execution.
      
      Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
      hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
      
      Change-Id: I9f350f20cdd010f2c096514b245b4a901ad74e46
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
      fdb708a3
  6. 01 Apr, 2015 2 commits
  7. 06 Feb, 2015 1 commit
  8. 05 Feb, 2015 1 commit
    • Vinit Deshpande's avatar
      Don't write to wpa_supplicant.conf directly · 0a217de1
      Vinit Deshpande authored
      
      There is a chance that wpa_supplicant may get killed during
      the time it is writing config file. If this happens, user
      information like SSIDs and passwords can be lost forever.
      
      This change works around that by writing config to a
      temporary file and then renaming the file to the correct name.
      
      Bug: 19224089
      
      Change-Id: I1709cdd5e5c6dfa3073e42c644fae941b43401cc
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVinit Deshpande <vinitd@google.com>
      0a217de1
  9. 28 Jan, 2015 2 commits
  10. 23 Jan, 2015 1 commit
    • Adam Langley's avatar
      Android: Remove superfluous OpenSSL include paths. · 8b05106d
      Adam Langley authored
      The libcrypto and libssl modules (and their respective static and host
      versions) use LOCAL_EXPORT_C_INCLUDE_DIRS thus just including the module
      is sufficient.
      
      Change-Id: If8722a70dd82aad34d4a203c2af46110c98f42dc
      8b05106d
  11. 08 Jan, 2015 2 commits
  12. 07 Jan, 2015 1 commit
  13. 05 Dec, 2014 1 commit
  14. 04 Dec, 2014 4 commits
  15. 03 Dec, 2014 3 commits
  16. 18 Nov, 2014 1 commit
  17. 17 Nov, 2014 2 commits
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      am 658fb4ad: Work around AP misbehavior on EAPOL-Key descriptor version · fee0f928
      Jouni Malinen authored
      * commit '658fb4ad':
        Work around AP misbehavior on EAPOL-Key descriptor version
      fee0f928
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      Work around AP misbehavior on EAPOL-Key descriptor version · 658fb4ad
      Jouni Malinen authored
      
      It looks like some APs are incorrectly selecting descriptor version 3
      (AES-128-CMAC) for EAPOL-Key frames when version 2 (HMAC-SHA1) was
      expected to be used. This is likely triggered by an attempt to negotiate
      PMF with SHA1-based AKM.
      
      Since AES-128-CMAC is considered stronger than HMAC-SHA1, allow the
      incorrect, but stronger, option to be used in these cases to avoid
      interoperability issues with deployed APs.
      
      This issue shows up with "WPA: CCMP is used, but EAPOL-Key descriptor
      version (3) is not 2" in debug log. With the new workaround, this issue
      is ignored and "WPA: Interoperability workaround: allow incorrect
      (should have been HMAC-SHA1), but stronger (is AES-128-CMAC), descriptor
      version to be used" is written to the log.
      
      Bug: 18411110
      
      Change-Id: I9ae12e8882adc9e785f6e4cef9f30b89bf72dcd2
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
      658fb4ad
  18. 11 Nov, 2014 1 commit
  19. 10 Nov, 2014 1 commit
  20. 27 Oct, 2014 3 commits
  21. 10 Oct, 2014 1 commit