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System services differ in designed access level.  Add attributes reflecting this
distinction and label services appropriately.  Begin moving access to the newly
labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
made system_server_service attribute.  Reflect the move of system_server_service
from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
appropriate.

Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b

Get ready to switch system_server service lookups into enforcing.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iefd4b2eee6cdd680f5ab423d15cc72a2a30e27cf

Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:

avc:  granted  { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc:  granted  { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602

Revert the tightening of /proc/net access. These changes
are causing a lot of denials, and I want additional time to
figure out a better solution.

Addresses the following denials (and many more):

  avc: denied { read } for comm="SyncAdapterThre" name="stats" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="facebook.katana" name="iface_stat_fmt" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="IntentService[C" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file
  avc: denied { read } for comm="dumpstate" name="iface_stat_all" dev="proc" ino=X scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

This reverts commit 0f0324cc
and commit 99940d1a

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 19034637
Change-Id: I436a6e3638ac9ed49afbee214e752fe2b0112868

SELinux domains wanting read access to /proc/net need to
explicitly declare it.

TODO: fixup the ListeningPortsTest cts test so that it's not
broken.

Bug: 9496886
Change-Id: Ia9f1214348ac4051542daa661d35950eb271b2e4

Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.

Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef

All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary.  Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.

Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a

mediaserver and drmserver both have permission to read oemfs
related files. However, there are no search permissions on the
directory, so the files would be unreachable.

Grant search permissions on the oemfs directory, so that the files
within that directory can be read.

Bug: 17954291
Change-Id: I9e36dc7b940bd46774753c1fa07b0f47c36ff0db

Change-Id: I6a0d56c23888535964e1559cb8ad63fedd27db47

Bug: 16635599

Change-Id: I69f9089dde1fe68762a38f4d97ddee2c20aaaa9d

A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp.
This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts
when handling AOSP contributions.

Resolve those conflicts.

This is essentially a revert of bf696327
for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only.

Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c

Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice.
Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the
functions exposed by drmservice.

Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e

Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.

Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d)

Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15

Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.

Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964

Change-Id: Ib693b563c2db6abc02cf7dbeb12ed61c09734fa8
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add a service_mananger class with the verb add.
Add a type that groups the services for each of the
processes that is allowed to start services in service.te
and an attribute for all services controlled by the service
manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service
name to target label.

Bug: 12909011
Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d

Neither mediaserver nor system_server appear to require
direct access to graphics_device, i.e. the framebuffer
device.  Drop it.

Change-Id: Ie9d1be3f9071584155cddf248ea85e174b7e50a6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  path="pipe:[167684]" dev="pipefs" ino=167684 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=fifo_file

Change-Id: I1120c8b130a592e40992c5233650345640a23a87
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

I didn't fix unpublished denials before switching this into enforcing. Need to revert.

This reverts commit ae505511.

Bug: 14844424
Change-Id: I01408b77a67ad43a8fb20be213d3ffbace658616

Change-Id: Ib4b4ebda74a9ebf08f38d73521d67bf98cd0ee67
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

See if we can remove these allow rules by auditing any granting
of these permissions.  These rules may be a legacy of older Android
or some board where the gpu device lived under /dev/graphics too.

Change-Id: I5c5d99ca97402de5196d9b6dfd249294f4d95baa
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Addresses denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=5114 comm="le.android.talk" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=9338 comm="MediaLoader" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394848620510_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287374 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=9896 comm="Binder_7" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394594346187_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287522 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file

This does not allow write denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1728 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394818738798_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82279 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Need to understand whether write access is in fact required.

Change-Id: I7693d16cb4f9855909d790d3f16f8bf281764468
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Required to support passing resources via open apk files over Binder.
Resolves denials such as:
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=31457 comm="SoundPoolThread" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file
 avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=31439 comm="Binder_2" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file

We do not allow open as it is not required (i.e. the files
are passed as open files over Binder or local socket and opened by the
client).

Change-Id: Ib0941df1e9aac8d20621a356d2d212b98471abbc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir>
files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and
untrusted apps.  But we had to allow read/write to support passing of
open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems
that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well,
only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket.  So there is no
real benefit to keeping it as a separate type.

Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until
restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility.

Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Resolves denials such as:

avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=7028 comm="wfd_looper" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket

This is a socket in the abstract namespace so no socket file is involved.

Change-Id: Ia0e384c08063466cfd0f17af3bccf294c7f9dbbd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

(cherry picked from commit 48b18832)

Change-Id: Ic75095397a11ad715c16a75a7374e9b0d131f3f7

Change-Id: I620d4aef84a5d4565abb1695db54ce1653612bce
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.

Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Steps to reproduce across devices.
  adb shell screenrecord --bit-rate 8000000 --time-limit 10 /data/local/tmp/test.mp4

* Allow surfaceflinger to talk to mediaserver
   avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=122 comm="surfaceflinger" scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=binder

* Give mediaserver access to gpu_device
   avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
   avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=2793 comm="VideoEncMsgThre" path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=6556 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: Id1812ec95662f4b2433e2989f5fccce6a85c3a41
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Addresses the following denial.
  avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=605 comm="Binder_2" name="IDM1013" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Witnessed denial on grouper. Policy change
seems appropriate for core policy though. To
reproduce:
* erase data partition or just delete all dirs
  under /data/mediadrm
* start netflix app and watch a movie

Change-Id: I515a195d45223249847fae70dc2ea9c9b216042f
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>

Re-purpose the existing bluetooth_socket type, originally
for /dev/socket/bluetooth used by bluetoothd in the old
bluetooth stack, for sockets created by bluedroid under
/data/misc/bluedroid, and allow mediaserver to connect
to such sockets.  This is required for playing audio
on paired BT devices.

Based on b/12417855.

Change-Id: I24ecdf407d066e7c4939ed2a0edb97222a1879f6
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.

Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.

This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.

Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.

Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858

When playing protected content on manta, surfaceflinger would crash.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  1. Launch Play Movies & TV
  2. Play any movie and observe

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  Device reboot while playing movies

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No device reboot

Even though this only reproduces on manta, this seems appropriate
for a general policy.

Addresses the following denials:

<5>[   36.066819] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:9): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" name="tlcd_sock" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=627097 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file
<5>[   36.066985] type=1400 audit(1389141624.471:10): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=1855 comm="TimedEventQueue" path="/data/app/tlcd_sock" scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[   41.379708] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:15): avc:  denied  { connectto } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path=006D636461656D6F6E scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:tee:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
<5>[   41.380051] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:16): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[   41.380209] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:17): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" name="mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
<5>[   41.380779] type=1400 audit(1389141629.786:18): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=120 comm="surfaceflinger" path="/dev/mobicore-user" dev="tmpfs" ino=4117 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tee_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Change-Id: I20286ec2a6cf0d190a84ad74e88e94468bab9fdb
Bug: 12434847

mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files.
Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses
the following denials:

<5>[   22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also
have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the
chracter devices may not be reachable.

Bug: 12416198
Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074

Too many bugs.

This reverts commit cc964543.

Too many bugs.

This reverts commit cc964543.

mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files.
Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses
the following denials:

<5>[   22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[   52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also
have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the
chracter devices may not be reachable.

Bug: 12416198
Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074

Change-Id: I3237c2f3629b2e9be7b2e20f5c3189313efd49e5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Use more general type names for the contents of /data/misc/camera and
/data/misc/audio.  These were the names used in our policy until 4.3
was released, at which point we switched to be consistent with AOSP.
However, the Galaxy S4 4.2.2 image, Galaxy S4 4.3 image, and
Galaxy Note 3 4.3 image all shipped with policies using _data_file names
because they were based on our older policy.  So we may as well switch
AOSP to these names.

Not sure if in fact these could be all coalesced to the new media_data_file
type for /data/misc/media introduced by
Ic374488f8b62bd4f8b3c90f30da0e8d1ed1a7343.

Options to fix already existing devices, which would only apply
to Nexus devices with 4.3 or 4.4 at this point:
1) Add restorecon_recursive /data/misc/audio /data/misc/camera to either
the system/core init.rc or to the device-specific init.*.rc files.
-or-
2) Add a typealias declaration in the policy to remap the old type names.
to the new ones.  Then existing types on persistent storage will be
remapped internally to the new ones.
-or-
3) Some sort of relabeld.

Option #2 is implemented by this change.

Change-Id: Id36203f5bb66b5200efc1205630b5b260ef97496
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>