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adbd writes debugging information to /data/adb
when persist.adb.trace_mask is set. Allow it.

Bug: https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=72895

(cherry picked from commit 973877db)

Change-Id: Ida2e0257c97941ab33ccdab59eb2cde95dca344f

Most files on /system are labeled with the "system_file" label, and
are readable by default by all SELinux domains. However, select
executables are labeled with their own label, so that SELinux knows
what domains to enter upon running the executable.

Allow adbd read access to labeled executables in /system. We do
this by granting adbd read access to exec_type, the attribute
assigned to all executables on /system.

This allows "adb pull /system" to work without generating
SELinux denials.

Bug: 18078338
Change-Id: I97783759af083968890f15f7b1d8fff989e80604

Remove permission from appdomain.

Bug: 16866291

Change-Id: I37936fed33c337e1ab2816258c2aff52700af116

Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.

Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9

Add adbd as a service_manager_local_audit_domain and negate
surfaceflinger_service in its auditallow. Negate keystore_service
and radio_service in the system_app auditallow.

(cherry picked from commit 88157ea3)

Change-Id: I25354db2add3135335c80be2c2d350e526137572

Change-Id: I35be7a7df73325fba921b8a354659b2b2a3e06e7

Addresses the following denial:

  type=1400 audit(0.0:24): avc: denied { create } for comm="adbd" name="md5sum" scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

Change-Id: Ibb1708af85b2235cbad2794993cfeef896f8db4a

The shell user needs to be able to run commands like
"cat /data/anr/traces.txt". Allow it.

We also need to be able to pull the file via adb.
"adb pull /data/anr/traces.txt". Allow it.

Addresses the following denials:

<4>[   20.212398] type=1400 audit(1402000262.433:11): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" path="/data/anr/traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   20.252182] type=1400 audit(1402000262.473:12): avc: denied { read } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   20.252579] type=1400 audit(1402000262.473:13): avc: denied { open } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   27.104068] type=1400 audit(1402000268.479:14): avc: denied { read } for pid=2377 comm="sh" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 15450720

(cherry picked from commit 4fd4a205)

Change-Id: Ide6f62183a1c6e2af4cbe84bb0ebb928cd8e63b7

The shell user needs to be able to run commands like
"cat /data/anr/traces.txt". Allow it.

We also need to be able to pull the file via adb.
"adb pull /data/anr/traces.txt". Allow it.

Addresses the following denials:

<4>[   20.212398] type=1400 audit(1402000262.433:11): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" path="/data/anr/traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   20.252182] type=1400 audit(1402000262.473:12): avc: denied { read } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   20.252579] type=1400 audit(1402000262.473:13): avc: denied { open } for pid=1479 comm="adbd" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<4>[   27.104068] type=1400 audit(1402000268.479:14): avc: denied { read } for pid=2377 comm="sh" name="traces.txt" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=325763 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 15450720
Change-Id: I767102a7182895112838559b0ade1cd7c14459ab

As of system/core commit 225459a5da21e9397ca49b0d9af7d5fe3462706b,
adbd no longer talks to vold. Remove the obsolete rule.

Bug: 12504045
Change-Id: I0a4f621afd8e5f8ab83219e7b0ff096c992d365f

Writing to the /proc/self/attr files (encapsulated by the libselinux
set*con functions) enables a program to request a specific security
context for various operations instead of the policy-defined defaults.
The security context specified using these calls is checked by an
operation-specific permission, e.g. dyntransition for setcon,
transition for setexeccon, create for setfscreatecon or
setsockcreatecon, but the ability to request a context at all
is controlled by a process permission.  Omit these permissions from
domain.te and only add them back where required so that only specific
domains can even request a context other than the default defined by
the policy.

Change-Id: I6a2fb1279318625a80f3ea8e3f0932bdbe6df676
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Newer adbd versions use functionfs instead of a custom adb usb gadget.
Make sure the functionfs filesystem is properly labeled, and that adbd
has access to the functionfs files.

Once labeled, this addresses the following denials:

<12>[   16.127191] type=1400 audit(949060866.189:4): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=223 comm="adbd" name="ep0" dev="functionfs" ino=5489 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file
<12>[   16.127406] type=1400 audit(949060866.189:5): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=223 comm="adbd" path="/dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0" dev="functionfs" ino=5489 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file
<12>[  377.366011] type=1400 audit(949061227.419:16): avc:  denied  { ioctl } for  pid=225 comm="adbd" path="/dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep2" dev="functionfs" ino=5564 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:functionfs:s0 tclass=file

Change-Id: Iee8b522e48b4d677fd12f7c83dbc7ffbc9543ad2

Addresses denials seen when attempting to take a screencaputre from ddms:
<5>[ 1232.327360] type=1400 audit(1393354131.695:41): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=18487 comm="screencap" name="nvhost-ctrl" dev="tmpfs" ino=4035 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 13188914

(cherry picked from commit ddde8c29)

Change-Id: I25c90a0f5dadf5f4e9f99cd27cf8740766a21aaa

Addresses denials seen when attempting to take a screencaputre from ddms:
<5>[ 1232.327360] type=1400 audit(1393354131.695:41): avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=18487 comm="screencap" name="nvhost-ctrl" dev="tmpfs" ino=4035 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Bug: 13188914
Change-Id: I758e4f87ab024035604d47eebae7f89f21ea1e3e

Change-Id: I620d4aef84a5d4565abb1695db54ce1653612bce
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This should be obsoleted by the restorecon in
I30e4d2a1ae223a03eadee58a883c79932fff59fe .

Change-Id: Iaeacb1b720b4ac754c6b9baa114535adc1494df2
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

As of system/core commit 225459a5da21e9397ca49b0d9af7d5fe3462706b,
adbd no longer talks to vold. Remove the obsolete rule.

Bug: 12504045
Change-Id: I0a4f621afd8e5f8ab83219e7b0ff096c992d365f

adbd was only in enforcing for user builds. Commit
Ib33c0dd2dd6172035230514ac84fcaed2ecf44d6 allows us to move
it into enforcing for everyone. Do it.

Change-Id: Ie1a3e5361c891d2c9366e11f35699e3146cc3d88

When adbd runs as root, it transitions into the
su domain. Add the various rules to support this.

This is needed to run the adbd and shell domains in
enforcing on userdebug / eng devices without breaking
developer workflows.

Change-Id: Ib33c0dd2dd6172035230514ac84fcaed2ecf44d6

Change-Id: Ic5aae78d575dba50d0a4bb78747da3ba4b81fb7b

adbd uses setpcap to drop capabilities from the bounding
set on user builds. See system/core commit
080427e4e2b1b72718b660e16b6cf38b3a3c4e3f

Change-Id: I6aec8d321b8210ea50a56aeee9bc94738514beab

Will likely want to split into adbd_user.te vs adbd.te before
going enforcing to support adb root and adb remount on non-user builds.
Possibly take all common rules to an adbdcommon.te.

Change-Id: I63040c7f5f0fca10b3df682572c51c05e74738a7
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Confine run-as (but leave permissive for now) and add
other allow rules required for the use of run-as and ndk-gdb
functionality.

Change-Id: Ifae38233c091cd34013e98830d72aac4c4adcae0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.

The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init

In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.

When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:

1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.

For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.

Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245

The /adb_keys entry will only take effect if a restorecon is
applied by init.rc on a kernel that includes the rootfs labeling
support, but does no harm otherwise.

The /data/misc/adb labeling ensures correct labeling of the adb_keys
file created if the device has ro.adb.secure=1 set.

Allow adbd to read the file.

Change-Id: I97b3d86a69681330bba549491a2fb39df6cf20ef
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.

Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11

Change-Id: Id41891b89c7b067919cbda06ab97d5eff2ad044f

sys_boot is not needed for adb as of system/core commit
ca8e66a8b0f843812014a28d49208f9f6f64ecbc

sys_boot is not needed for system server as of frameworks/base
commit dbcf2d7482562eff45ac727cea799b37a260e399

Change-Id: I61379ea858e05acd239c9b16e4e2bf454af3f51c

Long term this should be scoped down.

Change-Id: I261f05568566cca38bc5c43fbfa7ff1c816e5846

This rule doesn't work, as /proc/sysrq-trigger isn't properly labeled.
Revert this change for now.

This reverts commit bb2591e5.

Change-Id: Ief2d412dddf4cefdf43a26538c4be060df4cc787

Read access to /dev/log/* is no longer restricted.
Filtering on reads is performed per-uid by the kernel logger driver.

Change-Id: Ia986cbe66b84f3898e858c60f12c7f3d63ac47cf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: Ief2d412dddf4cefdf43a26538c4be060df4cc787

Read access to /dev/log/* is no longer restricted.
Filtering on reads is performed per-uid by the kernel logger driver.

Change-Id: Ia986cbe66b84f3898e858c60f12c7f3d63ac47cf
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Change-Id: I73a2b841ab3399b7528b8084a5c4736e6ecea48a

Change-Id: I73a2b841ab3399b7528b8084a5c4736e6ecea48a

This reverts commit ba84bf1d

Hidden dependency resolved.

Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392

This reverts commit 8a814a76

Change-Id: Id1497cc42d07ee7ff2ca44ae4042fc9f2efc9aad

Change-Id: I5a3584b6cc5eda2b7d82e85452f9fe457877f1d1
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Update policy for Android 4.2 / latest master.
Primarily this consists of changes around the bluetooth subsystem.
The zygote also needs further permissions to set up /storage/emulated.
adbd service now gets a socket under /dev/socket.
keystore uses the binder.

Change-Id: I8c5aeb8d100313c75169734a0fa614aa974b3bfc
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>