- 04 Sep, 2014 2 commits
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Nick Kralevich authored
If the sdcard daemon is restarted (crash or otherwise), one of the first things it attempts to do is umount the previously mounted /mnt/shell/emulated fuse filesystem, which is denied by SELinux with the following denial: sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:6997): avc: denied { unmount } for scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0 Allow the operation. Steps to reproduce: 1) adb shell into the device and su to root 2) run "kill -9 [PID OF SDCARD] Expected: sdcard daemon successfully restarts without error message. Actual: SELinux denial above, plus attempts to mount a new filesystem on top of the existing filesystem. (cherrypicked from commit abfd427a) Bug: 17383009 Change-Id: I386bfc98e2b5b32b1d11408f7cfbd6e3c1af68f4
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Nick Kralevich authored
If the sdcard daemon is restarted (crash or otherwise), one of the first things it attempts to do is umount the previously mounted /mnt/shell/emulated fuse filesystem, which is denied by SELinux with the following denial: sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:6997): avc: denied { unmount } for scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:fuse:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0 Allow the operation. Steps to reproduce: 1) adb shell into the device and su to root 2) run "kill -9 [PID OF SDCARD] Expected: sdcard daemon successfully restarts without error message. Actual: SELinux denial above, plus attempts to mount a new filesystem on top of the existing filesystem. Bug: 17383009 Change-Id: I386bfc98e2b5b32b1d11408f7cfbd6e3c1af68f4
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- 25 Jul, 2014 2 commits
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Nick Kralevich authored
As described in the system/core commit with the same Change-Id, there's a race condition between installd and sdcard when it comes to accessing /data/media. Resolve the race by checking /data/.layout_version to make sure the filesystem has been upgraded. Maybe indirectly fixes the following SELinux denial: sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:3): avc: denied { write } for name="media" dev="mmcblk0p17" ino=102753 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir (cherrypicked from commit 792d8650) Bug: 16329437 Change-Id: I5e164f08009c1036469f8734ec07cbae9c5e262b
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Nick Kralevich authored
As described in the system/core commit with the same Change-Id, there's a race condition between installd and sdcard when it comes to accessing /data/media. Resolve the race by checking /data/.layout_version to make sure the filesystem has been upgraded. Maybe indirectly fixes the following SELinux denial: sdcard : type=1400 audit(0.0:3): avc: denied { write } for name="media" dev="mmcblk0p17" ino=102753 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 16329437 Change-Id: I5e164f08009c1036469f8734ec07cbae9c5e262b
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- 24 Feb, 2014 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
These are obsoleted by the restorecon_recursive /data/media call added to the device init*.rc files, e.g. see I4a191d32a46104a68f6644398c152b274c7937a6 for the hammerhead change. If/when Ib8d9751a47c8e0238cf499fcec61898937945d9d is merged, this will also be addressed for all devices by the restorecon_recursive /data call added to the main init.rc file. Change-Id: Idbe2006a66817d6bb284d138a7565dec24dc6745 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 18 Feb, 2014 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
Should resolve b/13060688 - emulator writes to /storage/sdcard failing. Change-Id: I9f00d9dfcd1c4f84c2320628257beca71abf170b Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 11 Feb, 2014 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I8830c4b26f3fd9e8356e090ede1d7b4eaa6cb733 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 11 Jan, 2014 1 commit
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Nick Kralevich authored
Permissive domains are only intended for development. When a device launches, we want to ensure that all permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing. Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During development, this flag is false, and permissive domains are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into unconfined+enforcing. This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a minimal level of protection. Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds. Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
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- 19 Dec, 2013 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I1eba1535d650a09ee7640cb7f3664202be4a0a55 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 17 Dec, 2013 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
/data/media presently is left in system_data_file, which requires anything that wants to write to it to be able to write to system_data_file. Introduce a new type for /data/media, media_rw_data_file (to match the media_rw UID assigned to it and distinguish it from /data/misc/media which has media UID and media_data_file type), and allow access to it. We allow this for all platform app domains as WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE permission is granted to signature|system. We should not have to allow it to untrusted_app. Set up type transitions in sdcardd to automatically label any directories or files it creates with the new type. Change-Id: I5c7e6245b854a9213099e40a41d9583755d37d42 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 21 Oct, 2013 1 commit
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Nick Kralevich authored
This change removes the permissive line from unconfined domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving these domains into enforcing should be a no-op. The following domains were deliberately NOT changed: 1) kernel 2) init In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually work. When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains, we can: 1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line. 2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined. 3) Remove the permissive line 4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change. For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP. After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing. We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing and out of unconfined. Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
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- 20 May, 2013 1 commit
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repo sync authored
This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy. Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve security. Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
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- 15 May, 2013 1 commit
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repo sync authored
Bug: 4070557 Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
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- 29 Mar, 2013 1 commit
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Geremy Condra authored
Change-Id: I0b2ecdbddbed3d5ea1617c9ae9af7f8b1c9ace93
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- 28 Mar, 2013 1 commit
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Geremy Condra authored
Change-Id: I0b2ecdbddbed3d5ea1617c9ae9af7f8b1c9ace93
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- 22 Mar, 2013 2 commits
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William Roberts authored
Two new types are introduced: sdcard_internal sdcard_external The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute sdcard_type is introduced. The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external sdcards. Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
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Robert Craig authored
Change-Id: I2d4ace75f3e75f47f99e93d58922d5719b47fffe
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- 12 Jul, 2012 1 commit
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Stephen Smalley authored
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- 31 May, 2012 1 commit
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William Roberts authored
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