GitLab

Permissive domains are only intended for development.
When a device launches, we want to ensure that all
permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing.

Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During
development, this flag is false, and permissive domains
are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been
frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped
to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into
unconfined+enforcing.

This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a
minimal level of protection.

Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds.

Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858

Various third party apps come with their own binaries that they write out to
their sandbox directories and then execute, e.g.:
audit(1386527439.462:190): avc:  denied  { execute_no_trans } for  pid=1550 comm="Thread-79" path="/data/data/com.cisco.anyconnect.vpn.android.avf/app_bin/busybox" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=602891 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c39,c256 tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c39,c256 tclass=file

While this is not ideal from a security POV, it seems necessary to support for
compatibility with Android today.

Split out the execute-related permissions to a separate allow rule as it
only makes sense for regular files (class file) not other kinds of files
(e.g. fifos, sockets, symlinks), and use the rx_file_perms macro.

Move the rule to untrusted_app only so that we do not permit system apps
to execute files written by untrusted apps.

Change-Id: Ic9bfe80e9b14f2c0be14295c70f23f09691ae66c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Add a create_pty() macro that allows a domain to
create and use its own ptys, isolated from the ptys
of any other domain, and use that macro for untrusted_app.
This permits the use of a pty by apps without opening up access
to ptys created by any other domain on the system.

Change-Id: I5d96ce4d1b26073d828e13eb71c48d1e14ce7d6b
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

At this point, we still don't understand the root cause of
bug 10290009, or if it's even a real bug.  Rollback
29d0d406 so we an get a device
in this state and figure out the root cause of this problem.

This reverts commit 29d0d406.

Bug: 10290009

Bug: 10290009
Change-Id: Ic794299261672b36a2b630893b65ab176c3eee6b
(cherry picked from commit eaa4e844e4c8549c9b4808a1272876a6995ca5a7)

Bug: 10290009
Change-Id: Ic794299261672b36a2b630893b65ab176c3eee6b
(cherry picked from commit eaa4e844e4c8549c9b4808a1272876a6995ca5a7)

Change-Id: Ided2cf793e94bb58529789c3075f8480c0d0cf4e

OTAs aren't properly labeling /system, which is causing SELinux
breakage. Temporarily put isolated_app.te and untrusted_app.te
into permissive.

Bug: 9878561
Change-Id: Icaf674ad6b3d59cbca3ae796c930c98ab67cae9c

OTAs aren't properly labeling /system, which is causing SELinux
breakage. Temporarily put isolated_app.te and untrusted_app.te
into permissive.

Bug: 9878561
Change-Id: Icaf674ad6b3d59cbca3ae796c930c98ab67cae9c

Bug: 9872463
Change-Id: I47eabeace3387afd24c0fd4bee70e77c0a3586d5

This is needed to support "Verify App" functionality.
During side loading, the Verify App functionality reads the APK
to determine if it's safe to install.

Bug: 9863154
Change-Id: I33f6b0fd012f6cb194e253d5d92cf6189d6aa222

This is my first attempt at creating an enforcing SELinux domain for
apps, untrusted_apps, and isolated_apps. Much of these rules are based on the
contents of app.te as of commit 11153ef3
with extensive modifications, some of which are included below.

* Allow communication with netd/dnsproxyd, to allow netd to handle
  dns requests
* Allow binder communications with the DNS server
* Allow binder communications with surfaceflinger
* Allow an app to bind to tcp/udp ports
* Allow all domains to read files from the root partition, assuming
  the DAC allows access.

In addition, I added a bunch of "neverallow" rules, to assert that
certain capabilities are never added.

This change has a high probability of breaking someone, somewhere.
If it does, then I'm happy to fix the breakage, rollback this change,
or put untrusted_app into permissive mode.

Change-Id: I83f220135d20ab4f70fbd7be9401b5b1def1fe35

app.te covers a lot of different apps types (platform_app, media_app,
shared_app, release_app, isolated_app, and untrusted_app), all
of which are going to have slightly different security policies.

Separate the different domains from app.te. Over time, these
files are likely to grow substantially, and mixing different domain types
is a recipe for confusion and mistakes.

No functional change.

Change-Id: Ida4e77fadb510f5993eb2d32f2f7649227edff4f