Commit f80cadc4 authored by Alex Klyubin's avatar Alex Klyubin
Browse files

Deprioritize HMAC-MD5 in default TLS/SSL cipher suites.

Although HMAC-MD5 is not yet broken, the foundations are now much
more shaky that those of HMAC-SHA.
See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6151.

This CL also adds a comment about the key rules governing the
preference order of cipher suites used by default.

Bug: 11220570
Change-Id: I2a2fe4d427650081637efc14fd7c427a33cbea7e
parent dd29ea10
......@@ -742,7 +742,17 @@ public class CipherSuite {
// while maintaining the capability to connect to the majority of servers.
//
// Cipher suites are listed in preference order (favorite choice first) of the client.
// However, servers are not required to honor the order.
// However, servers are not required to honor the order. The key rules governing the
// preference order are:
// * Prefer Forward Secrecy (i.e., cipher suites that use ECDHE and DHE for key agreement).
// * Prefer AES to RC4 whose foundations are a bit shaky. See
// http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/. BEAST and Lucky13 mitigations are enabled.
// * Prefer AES_128+ and RC4_128 to 3DES_EDE. The effective bulk encryption key length of
// 3DES_EDE is reduced from 168 to only 112 bits by meet-in-the-middle attack.
// * Prefer 128-bit bulk encryption to 256-bit one, because 128-bit is safe enough while
// consuming less CPU/time/energy.
// * Prefer HMAC-SHA to HMAC-MD5. Although HMAC-MD5 is not yet broken, the foundations are
// much more shaky that those of HMAC-SHA. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6151.
//
// NOTE: Removing cipher suites from this list needs to be done with caution, because this
// may prevent apps from connecting to servers they were previously able to connect to.
......@@ -753,8 +763,8 @@ public class CipherSuite {
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
......
......@@ -727,7 +727,17 @@ public final class NativeCrypto {
// while maintaining the capability to connect to the majority of servers.
//
// Cipher suites are listed in preference order (favorite choice first) of the client.
// However, servers are not required to honor the order.
// However, servers are not required to honor the order. The key rules governing the
// preference order are:
// * Prefer Forward Secrecy (i.e., cipher suites that use ECDHE and DHE for key agreement).
// * Prefer AES to RC4 whose foundations are a bit shaky. See
// http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/. BEAST and Lucky13 mitigations are enabled.
// * Prefer AES_128+ and RC4_128 to 3DES_EDE. The effective bulk encryption key length of
// 3DES_EDE is reduced from 168 to only 112 bits by meet-in-the-middle attack.
// * Prefer 128-bit bulk encryption to 256-bit one, because 128-bit is safe enough while
// consuming less CPU/time/energy.
// * Prefer HMAC-SHA to HMAC-MD5. Although HMAC-MD5 is not yet broken, the foundations are
// much more shaky that those of HMAC-SHA. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6151.
//
// NOTE: Removing cipher suites from this list needs to be done with caution, because this
// may prevent apps from connecting to servers they were previously able to connect to.
......@@ -750,8 +760,8 @@ public final class NativeCrypto {
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
"TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
"TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA",
"SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5",
"TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
"TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
"SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA",
......
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